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ABSTRACT: We empirically examine the effect of self-efficacy on entrepreneurial investment 
choices. We identify various attributes of entrepreneurial investment, and argue that higher self-
efficacy is associated with more aggressive entrepreneurial investment decisions. We show that 
self-efficacy increases the likelihood of both being a nascent entrepreneur and creating an 
operating business. Self-efficacy also increases the proportion of personal wealth invested in the 
venture and the amount of hours per week the entrepreneur devotes to the venture. These results 
are significant even when controlling for other known characteristics associated with 
entrepreneurial investment. In contrast, we find no relationship between self-efficacy, or even 
risk preferences, and investment risk. 
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Introduction 
All entrepreneurial endeavors require investment. We examine the effect of individuals’ 
entrepreneurial self-efficacy (ESE) on their entrepreneurial investment choices. We define 
entrepreneurial investment as the deployment of resources by an individual to their new venture. 
Despite the breadth of investment decisions faced by entrepreneurs, little is known about their 
investment choices. We detail different attributes of entrepreneurial investment beyond simply 
the choice and amount of financial capital invested.  We argue that ESE affects several 
entrepreneurial investment choices, including entry decision, allocation of personal time and 
money, and investment risk. 
Self-efficacy is a cognitive construct that describes a person’s confidence in their ability 
to perform tasks. Self-efficacy has been shown to influence a broad range of individual’s 
cognition and behavior. For example, self-efficacy is associated with increased expectations and 
goals (Bandura, 2001), improved work-related performance (Stajkovic & Luthans, 1998), greater 
job search activity (Eden & Aviram, 1993), better academic performance (Luszczynska, 
Gutiérrez-Doña, & Schwarzer, 2005), and health-related choices (e.g. Clark & Dodge, 1999; 
McAuley, Courneya, Rudolph, & Lox, 1994; Wulfert & Wan, 1993). Self-efficacy can be either 
task-specific, relate to many related tasks within a domain, or be generalized. In this study, we 
focus on entrepreneurial self-efficacy, which relates to the confidence an individual has in their 
ability to accomplish tasks in the domain of entrepreneurship and venturing.  
We utilize the Panel Study of Entrepreneurial Dynamics (PSED), a longitudinal survey of 
entrepreneurs, to study the effect of ESE on entrepreneurial investment.  The PSED provides 
data on entrepreneurial investment and self-evaluative items to measure ESE, which we validate 
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through an out-of-sample survey. Validated measurement of psychology-based constructs is one 
of the major issues of applied research on the role of individual beliefs on economic choices 
(Puri & Robinson, 2007). The PSED sampling allows examination of how entrepreneurs are 
different from non-entrepreneurs and also investigation of whether cross-sectional variation in 
ESE among entrepreneurs leads to variation in investment choice. Additionally, adopting a field 
design addresses criticism of experimental designs that may lack task representativeness due to 
deficient incentives, use of salient signals, or subjects' inexperience (Simon & Houghton, 2003). 
This study contributes to our understanding of entrepreneurial investment in several 
ways. First, it contributes to the literature that investigates the relationship between psychology 
and entrepreneurship (e.g., Lowe & Ziedonis, 2006). Although previous studies have examined 
the ESE-intention relationship (Zhao, Seibert, & Hills, 2005) and the ESE-performance 
relationship (Hmieleski & Baron, 2008), few have investigated how ESE affects specific choices 
and actions the entrepreneur may take during venturing. Our longitudinal field design uses 
stratified sampling and sampling weights, rather than students or convenient samples of existing 
entrepreneurs common in prior research. This mitigates concerns over potential reverse causality 
between ESE and action and allows estimation of the economic magnitude of ESE on investment 
choices for the population of U.S. adults and nascent entrepreneurs. For example, we find that an 
increase in ESE from the 25
th
 percentile to the 75
th
 percentile in the population of U.S. 
individuals is associated with a 251 percent increase in the likelihood of being a nascent 
entrepreneur. Furthermore, an increase in ESE from the 25
th
 percentile to the 75
th
 percentile in 
nascent entrepreneurs is associated with a 60 percent increase in both the percentage of personal 
wealth invested and the hours per week devoted by the entrepreneur to their start-up. Our 
research design overcomes concerns from examining individuals at one point in time, in that we 
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can empirically determine the extent an entrepreneur invests because they possess high ESE 
without the contaminating effect of individuals having high ESE as a result of previous 
investment. Consistent with the importance of controlling for ESE feedback effects in the 
research design we find that individuals who achieve an operating business from their nascent 
activity have a subsequent increase in their ESE in later surveys relative to those individuals who 
did not. Overall, we find that ESE has a substantial causal effect on a range of entrepreneurial 
investment choices.  
Second, extant empirical research on entrepreneurial investment decisions has focused 
attention on the amount of financial capital invested (Bates, 1995; Bruderl, Preisendorfer, & 
Ziegler, 1992; Cooper, Woo, & Dunkelberg, 1989; McCarthy, Schoorman, & Cooper, 1993).  
Yet, financial capital allocation is only one dimension of the many investment choices 
entrepreneurs make. For example, entrepreneurs also choose how much labor to allocate to their 
ventures and the riskiness of their entrepreneurial investment. Surprisingly, investment of the 
entrepreneur’s time and venture riskiness have received little empirical attention (Shepherd, 
McMullen, & Jennings, 2007). Yet, economists regard both these choices to be fundamental to 
understanding entrepreneurial investment, entry, and action (Moskowitz & Vissing-Jorgensen, 
2002). By investigating an array of entrepreneurial investment attributes, this study provides 
novel evidence on investment choice at venture creation. Consistent with the notion that ESE 
affects individual action, we find that ESE plays a broad and significant role in entrepreneurial 
investment, influencing entrepreneurial entry and the allocation of personal time and money.  
Third, this study contributes to the literature on risk taking. Research on risky behavior in 
economic setting has explored the role of manager preferences on large, listed firm financial and 
operational choices. Given entrepreneurial activity is generally regarded as highly risky and there 
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is a stronger nexus between founder preferences and venture actions, studying new ventures 
provides a powerful setting for testing cross-sectional variation in risky choices. Surprisingly, we 
observe across several dimensions of risk taking, namely riskiness of industry entry, the 
importance of research and development (R&D) and whether the venture is high-tech, that 
neither ESE nor even risk preferences are significantly associated with riskier choices. While 
survey experiments have generally found a relationship between individuals’ risk preferences 
and risky choice, our results suggest that other factors, such as specific human capital, may 
inhibit the risk preferences of entrepreneurs being reflected in economic choices in the field. 
The following section describes ESE. We describe the different attributes of 
entrepreneurial investment and their posited association with ESE in section three. In section 
four we detail the sample, variables used to represent ESE, and the dependent and control 
variables. We provide the findings in section five, and a discussion of the implications and 
limitations of the study in section six. Section seven concludes. 
 
Entrepreneurial Self-Efficacy 
Self-efficacy refers to a person’s belief that they can perform tasks and fulfill roles, and is 
directly related to expectations, goals and motivation (Bandura, 1997, 2001). Individuals with 
high self-efficacy in a particular task are more likely to undertake actions related to the particular 
task, persist for longer in those tasks, and exert greater effort (Wood & Bandura, 1989b). Self-
efficacy has been shown to affect a wide range of choices, including work-related performance 
(Stajkovic & Luthans, 1998), small business growth (Baum & Locke, 2004; Baum, Locke, & 
Smith, 2001), job search activity (Eden & Aviram, 1993), academic performance (Hackett & 
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Betz, 1989; Luszczynska et al., 2005), choice of academic major (Hackett, 1985), and career 
choice (Lent & Hackett, 1987). 
An important aspect of self-efficacy is its level of specificity. At the broadest level, self-
efficacy can be completely general (Sherer, Maddux, Mercandante, Prentice-Dunn, Jacobs, & 
Rogers, 1982), referring to confidence about any and all tasks. At the narrowest level, self-
efficacy refers to beliefs about one’s confidence in completing one specific task successfully. 
However, as tasks are often interrelated by domain, self-efficacy can also refer to an individual’s 
confidence in abilities that apply to several related tasks within a domain. This latter example is 
referred to as domain-specific self-efficacy.  
In this study, we focus on a domain-specific self-efficacy, entrepreneurial self-efficacy, 
which describes a person’s confidence about their ability to perform the various tasks and roles 
relevant to entrepreneurship. We motivate the use of ESE, rather than general self-efficacy, to 
explain entrepreneurial investment because domain-specific self-efficacy has been shown to have 
greater predictive power than general self-efficacy when describing career choices (Betz & 
Hackett, 1983; Gist, 1987). Importantly, due to its domain specificity, ESE is not venture-
specific; individual’s ESE should apply at all entrepreneurial activity regardless of idiosyncratic 
factors related to each unique venture.  
One important issue is how ESE is related to, or distinct from, other psychological 
constructs that may affect investment choices. One of the main differences that distinguish ESE 
from other constructs is domain specificity. ESE focuses specifically on entrepreneurship, while 
constructs such as overconfidence, core self-evaluation, self-esteem, dispositional optimism, and 
locus of control relate to a person’s overall disposition. More generally, ESE differs from locus 
of control because self-efficacy refers to beliefs about achievable levels of performance or 
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behavior, while locus of control concerns beliefs about the achievements of outcomes in addition 
to performance levels (Rotter, 1966). Self-efficacy differs from self-esteem because self-esteem 
is an affective self-evaluation, such as ―I take a positive attitude towards myself‖ (Rosenberg, 
1965), whereas self-efficacy is a judgment about one’s capability to complete a task (Gist & 
Mitchell, 1992). Dispositional optimism connotes a generally positive outlook, not a judgment 
about one’s efficaciousness (Puri & Robinson, 2007). Core self-evaluation is a construct that 
encompasses locus of control, generalized self-efficacy, self-esteem and emotional stability 
(Judge & Bono, 2001). This broader construct, due to its abstractness, is not closely related to 
ESE, except that individuals with high core self-evaluation may be expected to have high ESE, 
as they would be more likely to have high domain-specific self-efficacy.  
Overconfidence has been defined as occurring when individuals overestimate the 
accuracy of their predictions or more generally when individuals hold excessive confidence in 
relation to abilities, knowledge, and beliefs (Hayward, Shepherd, & Griffin, 2006). Importantly, 
those individuals with a greater propensity for overconfidence with respect to entrepreneurial 
ability will likely have greater self-efficacy than others, holding actual ability constant. However, 
self-efficacy does not require any assumption of cognitive bias. Whether justified or otherwise, 
an individual’s belief that they can accomplish tasks in their chosen domain is expected to 
influence the relationship between beliefs and action. 
Survey evidence has found that ESE is positively related to entrepreneurial intention 
amongst students (Zhao et al., 2005). However, the extent that the intentions of students and the 
influence of ESE are reflected in the actions of a more general sample of entrepreneurs in an 
actual field setting can be questioned. Survey evidence has also shown that founder-managers of 
small businesses have higher ESE than non-founders who manage similar businesses (Chen, 
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Greene, & Crick, 1998). However, from this evidence it is difficult to distinguish whether the 
founders started their ventures because of high ESE or whether they have high ESE because they 
successfully founded their ventures (Forbes, 2005b). The latter is a concern because ESE is 
theorized to be influenced by feedback from entrepreneurial experiences (Zhao et al., 2005). By 
measuring ESE at the beginning of the entrepreneurial process, we mitigate the possibility that 
current venture performance influences ESE, thereby addressing concerns of reverse causality in 
previous studies. Further, our use of different instruments of varying mediums over time to 
obtain the dependent and independent variables addresses several concerns related to results 
being induced by common method bias in the research design, which is present in previous ESE 
research (Podsakoff, MacKenzie, Lee, & Podsakoff, 2003).  
We investigate self-efficacy in the entrepreneurial setting because there is a stronger 
nexus between the entrepreneur’s decisions and the new venture’s actions than exists in 
established firms, where formal processes and other actors mediate the influence of managerial 
bias on firm action (Simon, Houghton, & Savelli, 2003), and because the entrepreneurial setting 
is characterized by uncertainty, which is associated with an increased prevalence of personal 
beliefs in decision-making (Busenitz & Barney, 1997; Knight, 1921). The combination of high 
uncertainty and the direct connection between the entrepreneur’s beliefs and the venture’s 
actions make the entrepreneurial setting a powerful one in which to study the effect of self-
efficacy on investment.  
 
Hypotheses 
The beliefs that entrepreneurs hold during entrepreneurship can be at least partly 
explained by beliefs that individuals have beforehand and bring into entrepreneurship (Forbes, 
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2005a). The existence of high ESE amongst entrepreneurs (Chen et al., 1998) could be the result 
of self-selection from traditional employment to nascent entrepreneurship, self-selection from 
nascent to operating entrepreneurship, or obtained once in entrepreneurship (Forbes, 2005b). In 
the process of discovering, creating, or exploiting an entrepreneurial opportunity, regardless of 
the financial or non-financial career reasons for starting the business (Cassar, 2007), an 
individual is faced with several distinct investment choices including how much of their personal 
wealth and time to devote to the venture, whether and how much external funding to utilize, and 
the riskiness of their venturing activity. Underlying these choices is the entrepreneurial entry 
decision, as without entrepreneurial entry there is no entrepreneurial investment. 
Investment in the Nascent Stage 
Although entrepreneurial entry may not traditionally be considered an investment choice, 
entrepreneurial entry is a necessary precondition for investment, and therefore, a proxy for the 
existence of entrepreneurial investment. That is, an individual must first decide to pursue 
entrepreneurship before making personally costly venture-specific investments. Individuals with 
high ESE will tend to perceive themselves as able to exploit potential entrepreneurial 
opportunities as they can perform the tasks and exert the effort required to create a venture from 
the opportunity, and thus will be more likely to involve themselves in start-up activities. 
Empirical evidence has shown that domain-specific self-efficacy affects the challenges that an 
individual is willing to undertake (Bandura & Cervone, 1986) and that self-efficacy is a 
significant predictor of academic and career choices (Hackett, 1997). ESE has been found to be 
associated with entrepreneurial intentions in college students, and small business founders have 
higher ESE than non-founders (Chen et al., 1998; Zhao et al., 2005). We expand on previous 
research by providing evidence of ESE’s causal effect on entry in the nascent stage of 
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entrepreneurship by a representative sample in a field setting. We refer to individuals involved 
the start-up phase of a new business as nascent entrepreneurs.  
 
Hypothesis 1: Entrepreneurial self-efficacy is positively associated with involvement in 
nascent entrepreneurship. 
 
Investment in the Operational Stage 
Action is a necessary condition for operational entrepreneurship (McMullen & Shepherd, 
2006), and action is costly. While undertaking startup activities, nascent entrepreneurs can learn 
whether the benefits of creating an operating business to exploit the entrepreneurial opportunity 
outweigh the costs. The decision to exploit the opportunity through operation requires that 
nascent entrepreneurs expect the entrepreneurial profit to be enough to compensate them for their 
opportunity costs, uncertainty premium if they are risk averse, and the illiquidity of their 
financial investment (Cassar, 2006; Kirzner, 1978). When the nascent entrepreneur creates an 
operating business from their startup activity they can be characterized as an operational 
entrepreneur. The presence of an operating business signifies significant investments in the 
venture have been made. 
Self-efficacy is strongly related to goals, in that individuals with higher self-efficacy set 
higher goals for themselves and are more committed to achieving those goals compared to 
individuals with low self-efficacy (Wood & Bandura, 1989a, 1989b; Wood, Bandura, & Bailey, 
1990). Individuals with high self-efficacy tend to persevere when faced with difficulties, put 
greater effort into achieving goals, and achieve greater levels of performance (Bandura & 
Cervone, 1986; Locke, Frederick, Lee, & Bobko, 1984). High ESE nascent entrepreneurs may be 
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more likely to sustain the belief that they can overcome the risks and challenges of 
entrepreneurship, even as they learn about new risks and challenges during the startup phase.  
Therefore we expect individuals with high ESE to be more likely to persist in entrepreneurial 
venturing and deploy the necessary resources in order to transform the venture into an 
operational business.  
 
Hypothesis 2:  Entrepreneurial self-efficacy increases the likelihood that a nascent 
entrepreneur will create an operational business from their startup activity. 
 
Financial Capital Investment 
Entrepreneurial financial capital investment refers to the monetary resources deployed by 
the entrepreneur in order to discover, create or exploit an entrepreneurial opportunity. The 
entrepreneur has discretion regarding the amount of financial capital to commit to the venture 
and sources of that financial capital. 
As discussed above, self-efficacy is associated with goal-setting and goal commitment. 
Higher goals may manifest through greater projected venture scope, complexity, or size. An 
individual with high ESE may be more likely to believe that she can handle a larger, more 
complex venture, and set goals to that effect. The larger venture, in turn, may require greater 
resources, including financial capital. Furthermore, greater personal commitment to self-set goals 
may manifest through increased personal investment. Entrepreneurs with higher ESE will be 
more committed to their ventures and thus invest more of their personal wealth. The effect of 
ESE on goal setting and goal commitment will therefore lead to individuals with high ESE 
investing more of their own financial wealth in their ventures. 
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Another possibility is that personal financial investment can be affected by risk 
perception, which may depend on ESE. Individuals with higher perceived decision-making self-
efficacy are more likely to perceive opportunities rather than threats in risky choices (Krueger & 
Dickson, 1994). ESE may encompass decision-making self-efficacy when the relevant choices 
are in the entrepreneurial domain. Therefore individuals with higher ESE are likely to perceive 
opportunities rather than threats in entrepreneurship; they may perceive less risk than individuals 
with lower ESE. So, even if two individuals are considering the same investment, the individuals 
may have differing beliefs about the probability of success due to conditioning on ESE. In other 
words, the individual with high ESE may believe that the probability of success is greater. One 
reason for the difference between the unconditional and conditional risk perception is that the 
entrepreneur with high ESE may believe that she can motivate the effort necessary to overcome 
the obstacles that might prevent success, while the entrepreneur with low ESE expects to fail 
when faced with difficult obstacles to success.  Conditional on survival, the returns from 
entrepreneurial financial investment are significantly greater than returns from passive 
investments such as the stock market (Moskowitz & Vissing-Jorgensen, 2002). However, when 
investment in failed firms is taken into consideration, the returns are significantly lower than 
other investments. Believing that venture success is more likely, entrepreneurs with high ESE 
would assign additional weight to the venture return conditional on survival as opposed to the 
unconditional return, which, based on financial economic theory would shift their portfolio 
towards investment in the venture. Therefore, we expect entrepreneurs with high ESE to commit 
a greater share of their financial capital to the venture and worry less about being diversified in 
their entrepreneurial investment. 
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Alternatively, entrepreneurs with higher ESE may believe they can overcome obstacles 
and achieve success with fewer financial resources. Consequently, they may underestimate the 
financial resource endowments their ventures require. This would cause these entrepreneurs to 
invest less financial capital. If this alternative explanation is dominant, consistent with earlier 
predictions, we should observe a lower, rather than a higher, share of personal wealth devoted to 
the venture. However, the self-efficacy literature suggests an effect on goal setting and 
commitment, rather than an investment reduction effect (Bandura & Cervone, 1986; Wood & 
Bandura, 1989b). In other words, we expect individuals to engage in ventures that require more 
funds or to be more willing to commit funds. We do not expect individuals to hold the venture 
scale constant and reduce their investment levels. 
 
Hypothesis 3: Entrepreneurial self-efficacy is positively associated with the share of 
personal financial capital entrepreneurs will invest in their ventures. 
 
Personal Labor Investment 
Entrepreneurial investment is not limited to financial capital.  Entrepreneurs must also 
decide how much of their personal time and effort to devote to the venture. For an individual to 
invest personal labor in a new venture, they must perceive that the returns outweigh the 
opportunity costs, including leisure and lost wages from alternative vocational activity. As 
mentioned above, ESE affects goal setting and goal commitment. These should have a positive 
effect on personal labor investment for similar reasons as the positive effect they may have on 
personal financial investment. Therefore we predict that entrepreneurs with higher ESE will 
invest more time in their ventures.   
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Hypothesis 4: Entrepreneurial self-efficacy is positively associated with the amount of 
labor entrepreneurs will invest in their ventures. 
 
Investment Risk 
Risky investments can be defined as those with greater outcome uncertainty, positive 
outcomes that are more difficult to attain, or a potential for more severe consequences (March & 
Shapira, 1987; Moskowitz & Vissing-Jorgensen, 2002; White, Thornhill, & Hampson, 2006). An 
investment might have greater risk due to a higher degree of variation when there is a relatively 
high probability that an outcome far from the expected outcome will occur (Kallman, 2007). An 
investment can also be risky if it has a high probability of resulting in a loss, or if the magnitude 
of a possible loss is large (MacCrimmon & Wehrung, 1990). Furthermore, an investment can be 
risky if there is a lack of information with which to predict the outcome, such as in the 
introduction of a revolutionary product, as this would necessarily lead to a wide distribution of 
possible outcomes.  
The variance of returns, a common proxy for investment risk, can be decomposed into 
systematic variance and idiosyncratic variance. The portion of variance that is correlated with 
other assets, making it potentially hedge-able and therefore diversifiable, comprises the 
systematic variance. The remaining variance is idiosyncratic, which can be minimized if 
individuals hold a well-diversified portfolio. Entrepreneurs often hold un-diversified portfolios 
(Moskowitz & Vissing-Jorgensen, 2002), which exposes them to significant risk, a defining 
characteristic of entrepreneurship (Knight, 1921; Schumpeter, 1934).  
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We expect entrepreneurs with higher ESE to believe that negative outcomes are less 
likely, because they can be overcome by the entrepreneur’s skills and abilities (Camerer & 
Lovallo, 1999). Individuals with low self-efficacy, on the other hand, may be preoccupied with 
failure scenarios or be easily discouraged by potential failure (Bandura & Cervone, 1986). They 
would thus shy away from potentially risky situations. Perceived risk, therefore, may be 
negatively associated with ESE levels. Thus, entrepreneurs with higher ESE will involve 
themselves in riskier ventures than entrepreneurs with comparatively lower ESE who would 
avoid riskier ventures (Krueger & Dickson, 1994). More specifically, individuals with high ESE 
may be more likely to engage in ventures that have high unconditional or objective risk, because 
the perceived, subjective risk conditional on ESE is relatively lower. 
However, the ability for an entrepreneur to choose the level of their investment’s risk 
may be constrained by the variation in risk across an industry and his human capital and 
switching costs. Some industries offer less opportunity to undertake more risky behavior. For 
example, the opportunity to invest in uncertain pay-offs, such as research and development, is 
greater in high technology industries than in occupational industries such as hairdressing. 
Further, an individual who is trained and experienced in a low-risk occupational job may find it 
too costly, given the opportunity costs of not utilizing their current skills and making additional 
investment in human capital, to switch to a more risky field. Furthermore, the choice to enter an 
industry is likely influenced by psychic income and intrinsic factors (Carter, Gartner, Shaver, & 
Gatewood, 2003; Gimeno, Folta, Cooper, & Woo, 1997).  That is, individuals may choose 
specific industries due to a preference for a certain type of work and this preference may 
dominate risk explanations. Regardless, we expect individuals with greater ESE and with a 
preference for more risk to pursue riskier ventures. Similar to other choices, the nexus between 
Self-Efficacy and Entrepreneurial Investment 
16 
individual beliefs and risk should be stronger in smaller firms with more concentrated ownership 
than in larger, less concentrated firms (Coles, Daniel, & Naveen, 2006; Miller & Bromiley, 
1990). 
 
Hypothesis 5. Entrepreneurial self-efficacy is positively associated with venture risk. 
 
Method 
Sample 
We used the Panel Study of Entrepreneurial Dynamics (PSED) to investigate how ESE 
affects entrepreneurial investment decisions. The dataset is unique in that it obtains responses 
from nascent entrepreneurs who are currently in the startup phase of a new venture (Gartner, 
2004). Consequently, the PSED overcomes issues associated with survivorship and recall biases, 
which can be problematic when only entrepreneurs who have already established businesses are 
analyzed. The PSED also allows for a field study of the relationship between biases and 
investment choices in entrepreneurship, allowing for better task representativeness than can be 
accomplished in laboratory studies (Simon & Houghton, 2003). 
The PSED sample frame was all individuals at least 18 years old residing throughout the 
mainland U.S. The sample was identified through a random digit dialing methodology, with 
64,622 households surveyed. To be identified as a nascent entrepreneur and included in this 
study a respondent had to answer ―yes‖ and then ―no‖ to the following two questions: ―1) Are 
you, alone or with others, now trying to start a new business?; 2) Are you, alone or with others, 
now starting a new business or new venture for your employer? An effort that is a part of your 
job assignment?‖ These criteria ensure that the respondent, rather than an employer, makes the 
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entrepreneurial decisions. In addition, the respondent had to: 1) expect to have at least some 
ownership in the new firm; 2) have been actively trying to start the new firm in the past 12 
months; and 3) be currently involved in the startup phase of the venture.
1
  In the first round of the 
PSED, 830 respondents qualified as nascent entrepreneurs.  To allow for comparison between 
the nascent entrepreneurs and individuals not involved in nascent startup activity, PSED 
researchers interviewed a control sample of 431 individuals by telephone and sent questionnaires 
to 422 of them. 
Subsequently, the PSED researchers interviewed by phone a sample of nascent 
entrepreneurs, and sent a questionnaire by mail to a further sub-sample. The PSED followed up 
with three subsequent waves, interviewing the entrepreneurs by phone and with written 
questionnaires in each of the three subsequent waves on average 14, 33, and 55 months after the 
initial interview. On average, in each round, respondents returned the written questionnaires 53 
days after they were surveyed by phone. Some respondents did not answer some or all questions 
in every round of the PSED.  
An examination of the potential non-response bias revealed that individuals who were 
involved in the first round of phone interviews but did not respond to any written questionnaires 
were likely to be younger  (p < 0.01) and have fewer years of managerial experience (p < 0.05). 
Respondents’ (non-respondents’) average age and years of managerial experience were, 
respectively, 40 (36) and 7.7 (6.22). Respondents and non-respondents were not significantly 
different based on whether they had attended college, whether their parents were entrepreneurs, 
household income, gender, or marital status.  
                                                          
1
 Under these criteria all sample entrepreneurs owned at least 51 percent of the control rights of their ventures. 
Outsiders had a minority share in 112 of the remaining 823 entrepreneurs’ ventures. To investigate the potential for 
outside ownership to affect entrepreneurial investment decisions, all models were estimated using subsamples that 
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The independent variable of interest, ESE (and risk preference), was obtained from the 
mail questionnaire in the first stage of the PSED. All other independent variables are taken from 
the first round phone interview. The dependent variables are obtained from phone interviews in 
the first and subsequent waves of the PSED, as noted below. The use of different instruments of 
varying mediums over time to obtain the dependent and independent variables addresses several 
concerns related to common method bias (Podsakoff et al., 2003). Further, the longitudinal 
design allows for some testing of causal relationships between ESE and entrepreneurial 
investment, thereby addressing reverse causality concerns present in previous ESE studies.  
Entrepreneurial Self-Efficacy  
Our measure of ESE is obtained from averaging responses to four items, creating a scale 
that ranged from one to five. Responses were given on a 5-item likert scale ranging from 1-
completely disagree to 5-completely agree. The statements were: ―1) If I work hard, I can 
successfully start a business; 2) Overall, my skills and abilities will help me start a business; 3) 
My past experience will be very valuable in starting a business; 4) I am confident I can put in the 
effort needed to start a business.‖  Of the 1,261 respondents (nascent entrepreneurs and control 
group), 888 answered all four ESE questions.  The mean (median) of the ESE variable is 4.134 
(4.25). The standardized Cronbach Alpha of these responses is 0.77. 
To examine the construct validity of this and other measures used in the current study we 
performed an out-of-sample validity survey. The details of the validity study and results are 
reported in Appendix A. The raw correlation between our measure of ESE and the measure of 
CGC ESE from Chen, Greene and Crick (1998) is over 52 percent, indicating a moderate degree 
of convergent validity consistent with Puri and Robertson (2007). Further, to ensure that our 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
excluded ventures with outside ownership. This subset of entrepreneurs yielded similar results to the full sample and 
consequently are not reported. 
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measure of ESE is not proxying for other related constructs established in the literature we used 
established scales to measure overconfidence, general self-efficacy, locus of control, 
dispositional optimism, self esteem, and core self evaluation.  The correlation coefficients 
between ESE and these scales were all below 0.30, substantially lower than that observed for the 
established ESE scale. The difference between the correlation coefficients suggests discriminant 
validity, consistent with Zhao et al. (2005). 
Controls  
Risk preference is operationalized by the average of three questions whose answers are 
scaled to the interval [0,1], where a greater value indicates a preference for riskier situations. The 
questions are: 1) whether the respondent prefers a business with little risk of failure and little 
likelihood of making them a millionaire or a business that was much more likely to make them a 
millionaire but had a much higher chance of going bankrupt; 2) the importance the respondent 
places on obtaining information about the chances of going bankrupt when evaluating business 
opportunities; and 3) the extent that the respondent enjoys the challenge of situations that many 
consider risky. The raw correlation between our measure of risk preference and the measure of 
risk preference from the Jackson Personality Index-Revised (Jackson, 1994) is over 59 percent in 
our validity study sample.
2
  
Research has documented several variables that should be controlled for when 
investigating various entrepreneurial investment choices.  For example, the decision to be an 
entrepreneur has been shown to be associated with human capital, social/cultural capital, 
financial capital, and demographics (Davidsson & Honig, 2003; Holtz-Eakin, Joulfaian, & 
                                                          
2
 The cronbach alpha for the PSED-based risk questions is 0.48 in the validation study sample and 0.37 in the PSED 
sample. However, the correlation coefficient for the combined measure with the JPI-R score ( = 0.60) is greater 
than the correlation coefficient for any of the individual PSED-based risk questions with the JPI-R score, suggesting 
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Rosen, 1994; Hurst & Lusardi, 2004; Kim, Aldrich, & Keister, 2006; Parker & Belghitar, 2006; 
Zhao et al., 2005). Therefore, this study controls for the effects of human capital, financial 
capital, social capital, demographics, and venture characteristics. 
The human capital controls are whether the respondent completed college, managerial 
experience, and household income. We use a dummy variable to indicate whether college was 
completed. Managerial experience is the log of one plus the number of years the respondent has 
worked as a manager. We log household income to reduce skewness. Financial capital is 
controlled for using household wealth. We use the log of the household wealth measure 
developed in Kim et al. (2006), truncated at zero to avoid negative values. To control for social 
or cultural capital, we used a dummy relating to whether parents were self-employed (0-No; 1-
Yes), consistent with Kim et al. (2006). Demographic controls include a continuous variable of 
the respondent’s age, dichotomous variables for whether the respondent is female and whether 
the respondent is married, and regional dummies for four U.S. regions (South, Midwest, West, 
and Northeast).  
We also control for the stage of development of the product/service with a series of 
dummy variables. The stage of product development is given by the response to: ―At what stage 
of development is the product or service this (start-up/new firm) will be selling: 4) Completed 
and ready for sale or delivery; 3) A prototype or procedure has been tested with customers; 2) A 
model or procedure is being developed; 1) Still in the idea stage or no work has been done on the 
product or service?‖. 
Dependent Variables 
Nascent Entrepreneur takes a value of 1 for individuals involved in nascent startup 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
that the greatest convergent validity is gained by using the average of the three questions. The findings are consistent 
whether the combined measure or any of the individual measures are used to proxy for risk preference. 
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activity and 0 otherwise, for individuals in the control group. The PSED identified operational 
entrepreneurs, those who had founded operating businesses, with the question, ―How would you 
describe the current status of this start-up effort? Is it now an operating business, still in an active 
start-up phase, still a start-up but currently inactive, no longer being worked on by anyone, or 
something else?‖  This question was asked in each subsequent round of the PSED (rounds two 
through four). Operating Entrepreneur takes a value of 1 for nascent entrepreneurs who 
described their ventures as operating business in any subsequent round of the PSED, and 0 
otherwise.  For respondents who did not provide their status in a later phase of the PSED, 
Operating Entrepreneur was coded missing.
3
   
We use the response to ―How much of your own money, in total dollars, have you now 
put into the business?‖ at the time of initial questionnaire, divided by the individual’s household 
wealth to obtain a measure of the personal financial commitment (Wealth Share). The ratio of 
contributed capital to household wealth is a proxy for concentration of financial capital in the 
venture and thereby the entrepreneur’s exposure to venture’s idiosyncratic risk that could 
otherwise be avoided through diversification. Given the potential for ratios to result in extreme 
values, we truncate the values of wealth share above the 99
th
 percentile. We measured personal 
labor investment using the response to ―In the past week, how many hours have you devoted to 
this new business start-up?‖ (Hours per Week).4 
One potential concern with the above financial capital and hours devoted dependent 
variables is reverse causality. In particular, whether an entrepreneur devotes more hours per 
                                                          
3
 An alternative variable was used to verify the results from this self-reported measure. Under this alternative, any 
venture that had received funds from the respondent, received money, income, or fees from the sale of goods or 
services, and filed a federal income tax return was coded as an operating business.  The alternative definition was 73 
percent concordant with the self-reported operating business definition. In unreported results, the alternative 
definition yielded results similar to those of the self-reported operational business measure. 
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week on average because of a high ESE, or if the high ESE results from long hours spent 
working on the venture. In order to investigate the effect of potential reverse causality on our 
findings we utilize additional Wealth Share and Hours per Week dependent variables from 
subsequent waves of the PSED. In particular, Wealth Share Later and Hours per Week Later, are 
taken from the earliest phone interview from subsequent PSED waves (2-4) where the 
respondent answered the relevant question. Due to sample attrition between waves, there are 
fewer observations for these variables than the dependent variables from the first wave. We 
report results using both approaches given the trade-off between overcoming potential reverse 
causality and the benefits of greater power from a larger sample size. 
We employed five risk variables to measure the risk associated with entrepreneurial 
investment. First, we use a residual profitability measure based on Bitler, Moskowitz, and 
Vissing-Jorgensen (2005). Using data from the 1998 Survey of Small Business Finances (SSBF), 
we ran a cross-sectional regression of return on equity (ROE) ratios of firms on observable 
characteristics, including log of number of employees, log of total firm equity, firm age, firm age 
squared, the entrepreneur’s experience, as well as on dummies for entrepreneur education, 
gender, ethnicity, venture industry, year, and whether the firm was founded by the entrepreneur. 
The Bitler et al. (2005) measure takes a firm’s riskiness as the absolute value of the residual from 
the regression—a measure of idiosyncratic (un-diversifiable) risk.  To allow for use in this study, 
we take the median value for each 2-digit SIC code to represent an industry’s risk.   
The second measure we use is the rate of firm deaths amongst firms with 1-4 employees 
in each 3-digit SIC code industry group as reported in the 1997-1998 portion of the Business 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
4
 We winsorized four values greater than 100 hours of time per week; however, the results are robust to the 
winsorization.  
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Information Tracking Series provided by the U.S. Census. Higher firm death rates indicate that 
negative outcomes are more likely for a given industry.  
The third measure of riskiness is an idiosynchronous return measure based on Li et al. 
(2004). Variance in stock price reflects volatility in the market’s expectations and thus riskier 
cash flows expected in the future. We operationalized the riskiness of an industry in terms of the 
average variance beyond a market model regression of firm returns for each 3-digit SIC code. 
This indicates the level of idiosyncratic risk to financial returns for individual firms within an 
industry. We use the median variance from firm-specific market model regressions within each 
3-digit SIC code, for public firms with at least 50 observations of monthly returns between 
January 1998 and December 2002 from the Center for Research in Security Prices.  A higher 
value of this measure indicates that individual firm returns in an industry have greater 
idiosyncratic risk.
 
For ease of presentation, all three operational risk measures are multiplied by 
100. 
Finally, we tested two self-reported dichotomous measures to capture the risk associated 
with entrepreneurial investment. The first dichotomous measure is whether research and 
development (R&D) spending is a high priority. R&D intensity has been suggested and used by 
researchers as a risk measure (Amit & Livnat, 1988; Kamien & Schwartz, 1971; Loury, 1979; 
Miller & Bromiley, 1990; Scherer, 1967), and has been shown to increase the variance of 
earnings (Kothari, Laguerre, & Leone, 2002), a common measure of riskiness for established 
firms. The second dichotomous risk measure is whether the respondent considers the venture to 
be high-tech. High-tech ventures are generally considered to be intrinsically risky (Carpenter, 
Pollock, & Leary, 2003; Mahmood, 2000; Singh, 1986).  
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The dependent variables were modeled using logistic regressions for binary dependent 
variables and ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions for continuous variables. All reported 
tests use unweighted data and are tested using two-tailed tests. All findings using adjusted 
surveying weights provided by the PSED are consistent with the unweighted results presented 
below.  
 
Results 
Descriptive Statistics 
Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics and Pearson correlation coefficients of the study 
variables.  Not all respondents answered every question in the PSED, which leads to variation in 
the number of responses for each variable. Further, there are missing correlations between 
Nascent Entrepreneur and several variables because these were only asked to individuals in the 
nascent entrepreneur group. 
ESE is significantly correlated with several of the decision variables in the direction 
hypothesized. It has a positive correlation with Nascent Entrepreneur ( = 0.29, p < 0.001), 
Operating Entrepreneur ( = 0.16, p < 0.001), Wealth Share ( = 0.13, p < 0.01), Hours per 
Week ( = 0.26, p < 0.10), and Industry Death Rate ( = 0.09, p < 0.10). Individuals with higher 
ESE are more likely to have significantly greater risk preferences ( = 0.20, p < 0.001). 
------------------------------- 
 Insert Table 1 about here  
------------------------------- 
Entrepreneurial Entry 
Our regression results suggest that ESE is generally associated with more aggressive 
entrepreneurial investment. We report the results for entrepreneurial entry in Table 2.  Columns 1 
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and 2 report the coefficients for the logistic model of being a nascent entrepreneur, without and 
with controls, respectively. Given the similar findings between these models we restrict 
comments to discussion of the full models. The coefficient on ESE is positive and significant ( 
= 0.86, p < 0.001), consistent with Hypothesis 1, that individuals with high ESE are more likely 
to be nascent entrepreneurs.
5
 Risk preference was not significant.
6
 A change in ESE (Risk 
Preference) from the 25
th
 to the 75
th
 percentile increases the expected likelihood of being a 
nascent entrepreneur in our sample from 57 (63) percent to 76 (67) percent (when all other 
variables are at their means), an increase of 33 (5) percent. The weighted results based on a 
representative sample of U.S. individuals aged 18 or above provide an even stronger ESE effect, 
with a change in ESE from the 25th (2.75) to the 75
th
 (3.75) percentile increasing the likelihood 
of being a nascent entrepreneur from 2.06 percent to 7.25 percent (when all other variables are at 
their weighted means), an increase of 251 percent.  
Column 4 reports the coefficients for the full logistic model of becoming an operational 
entrepreneur. For our sample, 44 percent of nascent entrepreneurs founded operating businesses 
                                                          
5
 To investigate the possibility that previous entrepreneurial experience may affect the findings or that those with no 
previous entrepreneurial experience may more truly capture entrepreneurial entry, we partitioned the sample by 
whether the respondent was self-employed full-time anytime during the previous ten years. The results of the 
nascent entrepreneurship model are consistent for both the sub-sample of 333 individuals with no entrepreneurial 
experience and those 327 individuals with entrepreneurial experience. 
6
 To investigate if question differences between the field study of nascent entrepreneurs and the validation study of 
business students may be contributing to the non-significance of risk preferences on entrepreneurial intentions we 
performed regressions of entrepreneurial intent using the validation sample. Specifically, we regressed Chen et al. 
(1998) measure of entrepreneurial intent on gender and: 1) the PSED entrepreneurial self-efficacy and risk 
preference measures; and 2) the Chen et al. (1998) entrepreneurial self-efficacy and JPI Risk Taking (Jackson, 1994) 
measures. The results from this untabulated regression show that the association between entrepreneurial intentions 
and ESE and risk preference is actually stronger for the PSED-based measures, suggesting that the specific choice of 
risk preference measure is not contributing to the insignificant relationship in the PSED sample. Taken together, the 
results from the two studies is more consistent with sample or research design differences causing weaker findings 
in the field sample. In particular, the use of field studies offers greater task representativeness then achieved from 
using student subjects about their intended behavior (Simon & Houghton, 2003). Further, the soliciting of responses 
for the dependent and independent variables using different instruments based on phone and mail surveys an average 
of one month apart reduces potential sources of educed correlation from common method biases (Podsakoff et al., 
2003). Both these effects should reduce the strength of the observed association between the dependent and 
independent variables in the field sample. 
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based on their startup activity, which is similar to other PSED-based research (Parker and 
Belghitar, 2006). Consistent with Hypothesis 2, the coefficient on ESE is positive and significant 
( = 0.80, p < 0.001). A change in ESE (Risk Preference) from the 25th to the 75th percentile is 
associated with an increase (decrease) in the likelihood of being an operational entrepreneur 
from 33 (42) percent to 53 (40) percent (when all other variables are at their means), an 
equivalent increase of 60.6 percent in likelihood.  This evidence suggests that nascent 
entrepreneurs with higher ESE are substantially more likely to found operational businesses 
based on their startup activity. The results from the Nascent and Operating Entrepreneur models 
suggest that ESE both significantly increases the likelihood of an individual becoming a nascent 
entrepreneur and increases the likelihood of a nascent entrepreneur founding an operational 
business based on the startup activity.  
------------------------------ 
 Insert Table 2 about here  
------------------------------ 
 
Financial Capital and Hours Invested 
Table 3 presents the tests for financial and labor investment in entrepreneurship. We 
report the coefficients from the full OLS regression model of Wealth Share in column 1 and 
Wealth Share Later in column 2.
7
 The coefficient on ESE is positive and significant in both cases 
( = 0.10, p < 0.05 for first wave;  = 0.17, p < 0.10 for Later), which supports Hypothesis 3, 
that entrepreneurs with greater ESE invest a larger share of their financial portfolio in their 
ventures. Using the findings from the first wave regression, an increase in ESE from the 25
th
 
                                                          
7
 Since Household Wealth is the denominator in the Wealth Share variable, household wealth was not used as a 
control in the regression model for Wealth Share. Similarly, given strong correlation between household wealth and 
income, Household Income was also excluded from this regression. Importantly, the main findings from the Wealth 
Share model are unchanged if either or both of these controls are included. 
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percentile to the 75
th
 percentile is associated with an increase in Wealth Share from 15.8 to 26.2 
percent, an increase of approximately 65 percent.  
------------------------------- 
Insert Table 3 about here 
------------------------------- 
Columns 3 and 4 present the coefficients from the OLS regression models of Hours per 
Week and Hours per Week Later, respectively.  The coefficient on ESE is positive and significant 
( = 8.18, p < 0.001 for first wave;  = 8.41, p < 0.05 for Later).  An increase in ESE from the 
25
th
 percentile to the 75
th
 percentile is associated with an increase in Hours Per Week from 13.7 
to 21.9, an increase of approximately 60 percent. This supports Hypothesis 4, that entrepreneurs 
with greater ESE invest more personal labor in their ventures. For both Hours per Week and 
Wealth Share, the first wave specifications, due to their greater sample size, have lower standard 
errors and consequently exhibit greater statistical significance. However, the coefficients are 
similar in magnitude and sign, which suggests consistency across the results. 
Investment Risk 
We present the results of the investment risk models in Table 4. We present the 
coefficients from the models of the Bitler et al. (2005) risk measure, the Li et al. (2004) risk 
measure, and the industry death rate risk measure in columns 1, 2, and 3, respectively. 
Inconsistent with our hypothesis, ESE is not significant in any of the models of risk, aside from 
the marginally positive significance in the industry death rate model. Further, even the risk 
preference of the entrepreneur is not associated significantly with organizational risk. In 
economic terms, an increase in ESE (Risk Preference) from the 25
th
 percentile to the 75
th
 
percentile is associated with in an increase in the expected industry death rate from 10.9 (11.3) to 
12.3 (11.5) percent, an increase of approximately 12 (1.5) percent. 
Self-Efficacy and Entrepreneurial Investment 
28 
------------------------------- 
Insert Table 4 about here 
------------------------------- 
Columns 4 and 5 present the coefficients from the dichotomous risk measures based on 
whether the venture is high-tech and whether spending money on R&D is a major priority, 
respectively. Again, we hypothesize that individuals with higher ESE will be more likely to be 
involved in ventures with more manager-based risk. However, ESE is not significant in either of 
these models, thereby failing to support Hypothesis 5. Again, risk preference is also not observed 
to be associated with venture risk. 
Industry Controls 
All the presented results are tabulated without industry controls. Industry differences may 
explain variation in several of the dependent variables examined in this study. For example, 
industry may influence venture scale given variations in viable or efficient scale of ventures 
across different industries (Bates, 1995; Cassar, 2006). Further, different industries, given their 
varying operating structures and risk, may have varying access to financial and other resources. 
Industry may also proxy for the difficulty associated with transforming startup activity into an 
operating business. However, there are also arguments against controlling for industry. 
Specifically, if individuals can choose their industry for venturing, these industry choices may be 
a function of intended scale, resource requirements and venturing difficulty. Consistent with the 
assumptions underlying the industry risk regressions in Table 4, ESE, risk preference, and other 
factors may influence industry choice, whereby entrepreneurs optimize on expected returns, risk 
preferences and non pecuniary factors. Therefore, the decision to control for industry effects 
depends on if the industry choice of the entrepreneur is assumed to be endogenous or exogenous. 
To examine the possibility that our ESE and risk preference findings are driven by industry 
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differences we included 2-digit SIC code industry dummies for the Operating Entrepreneur, 
Wealth Share, and Hours per Month regressions. In unreported results, all our findings for ESE 
and risk preference are invariant to the inclusion or exclusion of industry controls. 
Path Analysis 
The results thus far suggest that ESE is associated several aspects of entrepreneurial 
investment. To explore potential direct and indirect influences of ESE on entrepreneurial 
investment, we estimated path models using maximum likelihood in AMOS 16.0. Based on the 
arguments put forward in the hypotheses section and extant theories on the effects of domain-
specific self-efficacy, there is potential for ESE to affect entrepreneurial investment through its 
effects on goal setting, goal commitment, and risk perception. We operationalize goal setting 
through a latent variable with two indicators. The first indicator is the log of one plus the 
venture's expected sales in five years. The second indicator is the log of one plus the venture's 
expected number of full-time employees in five years. These indicators capture the projected 
scale or complexity of the venture, which proxy for the entrepreneur's goal setting through size 
intentions (Cassar, 2006). The risk perception variable is based on the question, ―On a scale of 
zero to one hundred, what is the likelihood that this business will be operating five years from 
now, regardless of who owns and operates the firm?‖ To our knowledge, the PSED does not 
offer a variable that can be thought to proxy for goal commitment. Therefore this potential 
intermediating construct is left out of the path models. Its effects may, however, be reflected in 
significant coefficients on the direct paths from ESE to the dependent variables.  
The paths examined are depicted in Figure 1. The path analyses are conducted with 
Operating Entrepreneur, Wealth Share, and Hours per Week as dependent variables.
8
 ESE can 
                                                          
8
 Because the moderating variables are venture-specific, they were not asked to the PSED control sample, so 
Nascent Entrepreneur cannot be used as a dependent variable.  
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affect each dependent variable directly, or through its effects on risk perception and goal setting. 
More complicated path models that included the controls used in the OLS specifications were 
also analyzed for each dependent variable. However, we only report the simplified version, 
without controls, because the findings are similar.  
Results are reported in Table 5. The model for Operational Entrepreneur has a good fit 
with the data (X
2
[3] = 6.258, CFI = 0.97, RMSEA = 0.29), as reported in column 1. All of the 
paths are at least marginally statistically significant (p < 0.10). Individuals who perceive their 
ventures as less risky are more likely to reach the operational stage. This significant positive 
effect is to be expected if individuals can to some degree predict venture outcomes. The path 
coefficient from venture scale to Operating Business is negative, suggesting that larger, more 
complex startups are less likely to become operating businesses. The total effect of ESE on 
Operating Entrepreneur is 0.125, which is close to but slightly less than the direct effect, 
suggesting that the negative ESE-Scale-Operating Entrepreneur effect dominates the positive 
ESE-Risk Preference-Operating Entrepreneur effect. Alternative models were estimated with 
various combinations of paths 1, 4, and 5 (in Figure 1) constrained to zero (seven other models in 
total). Each of these models had a significantly worse fit (p < 0.07 for the best of the seven) than 
the full model in Figure 1. 
The path results for Wealth Share are presented in Table 5, Column 2. The overall model 
has good fit statistics (X
2
[3] = 5.887, CFI = 0.97, RMSEA = 0.28). However, only the 
coefficients on paths 1, 2, and 3 are significant (p < 0.05, 0.001, and 0.01, respectively). The 
coefficients on paths 4 and 5 are not statistically significant. Constraining these path coefficients 
to zero did not significantly affect model fit (X
2
[2] = 0.959, p = 0.62), suggesting that only the 
direct path is significant.  
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The main path model estimated for Hours per Week was inadmissible, because the 
variance on the error term related to 5-year ahead sales projections was estimated to be negative, 
and negative variances are impossible. A specification search was performed to find the best-
performing admissible model, allowing combinations of the coefficients on paths 1, 4 and 5 to be 
constrained to zero. Eight models were compared. In addition to the model in which the three 
path coefficients were unconstrained, the model constraining only the coefficient on path 5 was 
also inadmissible. The remaining six models examined were admissible. Of admissible models, 
the model with only the direct effect (path 1) coefficient unconstrained had the lowest RMSEA 
and C/df (0.046 and C/df = 3.617, respectively). However, statistics are mixed on whether this 
model has a good fit with the data (X
2
[5] = 18.087, p = 0.003, CFI = 0.898, RMSEA = 0.046), so 
the coefficients are not tabulated in Table 5, as the direct effect is already estimated in the main 
results shown in Table 3. 
It is somewhat surprising that Wealth Share and Hours per Week may not be affected by 
risk perception and venture scale. Based on the theories concerning self-efficacy, the direct path 
may represent goal commitment or aspects of goal setting and risk perception not captured by 
our empirical proxies. Further, path analyses were conducted with each of the five risk measures 
as dependent variables, but the results were qualitatively very similar to the results from the OLS 
analysis, in that the direct and indirect paths from ESE to risk measures were insignificant. 
Therefore these results are not reported. 
Changes in ESE from Entrepreneurial Experiences 
To examine the importance of controlling for changes in ESE as a result of feedback 
from entrepreneurial experiences, consistent with Zhao et al. (2005), we performed a regression 
modeling ESE after the entrepreneurial activity (Later ESE) as a linear function of the initial 
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ESE and whether the individual achieved an operating business from their nascent activity 
(Operating Entrepreneur). Specifically, Later ESE was taken from the latest mail questionnaire 
from the PSED, which represented when the individual quit the venture, the venture failed, the 
venture became an operational business, or the latest mail questionnaire while the venture was 
still in the start-up phase. For the model estimated on the 408 individuals that have non-missing 
responses for ESE, Operating Entrepreneur and Later ESE, we observe the coefficient on 
Operating Entrepreneur is positive and significant ( = 0.12, p < 0.04) consistent with positive 
(negative) feedback from entrepreneurial experiences being associated with relative increase 
(decrease) in individual’s ESE. This highlights the importance of controlling for feedback effects 
when making causal inferences on ESE and entrepreneurial behavior. As expected, we also find 
initial ESE to be positive and significantly associated with later ESE ( = 0.40, p < 0.001).     
Discussion 
Implications for Theory and Practice 
This study contributes to the literature by conducting a novel investigation of the role of 
self-efficacy on several dimensions of entrepreneurial investment choice. While research in 
entrepreneurial investment has focused on either the entry decision or financial capital allocation, 
our results show that self-efficacy is a significant factor in decisions related to entrepreneurial 
entry, capital sources of entrepreneurial ventures, and personal labor allocation. Decomposing 
entrepreneurial entry into two sub-decisions: nascent entrepreneurship and operational 
entrepreneurship, we find that ESE is a significant driver of the decision both to invest in 
discovering an entrepreneurial opportunity and to exploit an entrepreneurial opportunity. 
Therefore, our evidence is consistent with the prevalence of ESE amongst existing entrepreneurs 
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being driven by both a propensity to enter entrepreneurship and the effect of ESE on the 
transition from nascent to operational entrepreneurship.  
Prior evidence showing higher ESE in founder-managers than non-founders makes it 
difficult to determine the true causal affect on ESE on entrepreneurial behavior, as ESE is 
influenced by feedback from entrepreneurial experiences. Therefore, individuals who have 
successfully founded new businesses may experience an increase in ESE, due to positive 
feedback, relative to individuals who were unsuccessful in venturing who experience negative 
feedback. Consistent with these conjectures, we find that individuals who achieve an operating 
business from their nascent activity have an increase in their ESE in future surveys relative to 
those entrepreneurs who did not. This observed ESE feedback effect highlights the importance of 
using a longitudinal research design to investigate causal associations on ESE on entrepreneurial 
behavior. Overall, by showing that ESE causally affects entry and investment at different stages 
of the entrepreneurial process, we contribute to the understanding of entrepreneurial entry and 
investment, and consequently, to the organizational creation literature. 
Beyond the entrepreneurial entry decisions, we further examined the investment of 
financial and human resources in entrepreneurship. We found that individuals with high self-
efficacy devoted a greater proportion of their wealth and more time per week to venturing 
activities. We argued that entrepreneurs with greater ESE, having greater belief in their 
entrepreneurial talents, undertake more aggressive actions across both of these dimensions of 
entrepreneurial investment. Overall, our findings expand understanding of entrepreneurial 
investment decisions to a wide range of choices affecting both operational and financial aspects 
of new ventures. The breadth of results suggests that individuals with high self-efficacy generally 
invest more aggressively in the highly uncertain entrepreneurial setting. Therefore, we contribute 
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to the literature by providing evidence of links between beliefs about oneself and economic 
decisions made under uncertainty. Further, we contribute to literature on entrepreneurial 
investment by considering finer conceptualizations of investment and of entrepreneurship. 
Research has shown the consequences of firms’ aggressive investment using their 
expenditures in R&D and deployment of financing. While contingent on the firm’s environment, 
several studies have shown better financial performance for those firms that undertake greater 
commitment in the investment and exploitation of resources to achieve a competitive advantage 
(Feeser & Willard, 1990; Fombrun & Ginsberg, 1990; Grinyer, McKiernan, & Yasai-Ardekani, 
1988; Weinzimmer, Bond III, Houston, & Nystrom, 2003).
9
 Our study differs from this research 
in that we consider individuals’, rather than firms’, investment choices. Notably, readers should 
be careful in interpreting the achievement of an operating business by individuals with greater 
self-efficacy as a successful outcome. For example, greater investment of effort and financial 
capital should result in a greater likelihood of achieving a viable operating business and greater 
revenues and profits. However, whether this aggressive investment is a good outcome is 
dependent on the financial returns and non-pecuniary benefits being commensurate with the 
opportunity costs of the effort and capital investment made, which is not observed in this study. 
More generally, we contribute to the broader literature on investment aggressiveness by 
considering an individual’s investment aggressiveness rather than the firm’s investment 
behavior. 
Our findings have implications for practitioners operating in uncertain settings. 
Entrepreneurs and managers can benefit from understanding that ESE leads to more aggressive 
decisions in entrepreneurial settings. In situations where aggressive investment decisions may be 
                                                          
9
 For a theoretical counter argument see McGrath’s (1999) discussion of real options. 
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highly detrimental, such as when industry sales are declining (Romanelli, 1989), entrepreneurs 
can use formal decision-making procedures or teams to more closely monitor and control the 
effects of an individual’s self-efficacy (Schweiger, Sandberg, & Ragan, 1986). Alternatively, 
entrepreneurs can allow self-efficacy to flourish in situations where investment aggressiveness is 
considered more beneficial, such as when it is necessary to gain a first-mover advantage or avoid 
laggard disadvantages (Agarwal & Gort, 2001; Lieberman & Montgomery, 1988; Narasimhan & 
Zhang, 2000). This may be particularly relevant for firms that engage in or encourage corporate 
entrepreneurship. 
While distinct from other psychological constructs, we would expect that the observed 
associations between ESE and aggressive investment may also exist between other psychology-
based measures of self-belief and aggressive investment. Specifically, locus of control, self-
esteem, core self-evaluation, and overconfidence, which all represent various beliefs about one’s 
abilities, attitudes, or outcomes of actions, may positively influence the extent to which 
individuals invest in entrepreneurial activity. Such beliefs may also affect the degree to which 
entrepreneurial investments are perceived to be sunk and the extent to which individuals escalate 
their commitment of investment in venturing when the objective likelihood of success is low. For 
example, there is some evidence suggesting that self-efficacy and confidence is associated with 
greater commitment of resources in settings that are highly risky or highly likely to be a losing 
course of action (McCarthy et al., 1993; Whyte, Saks, & Hook, 1997). While we show greater 
self-efficacy is associated with greater entrepreneurial investment, given our research design, we 
cannot determine whether this is also an inappropriate over-commitment of resources to the 
startup activity. For example, we observed that self-efficacy is associated both with greater 
investment and greater likelihood of achieving an operating business from nascent activity. 
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Future research could investigate how various beliefs about oneself are associated with a broad 
range of entrepreneurial activities.   
Limitations and Future Research 
Interestingly, we did not observe self-efficacy or risk preference affecting entrepreneurial 
investment risk. We posited that individuals with high self-efficacy and higher risk preferences 
would make riskier entrepreneurial investments, which would be reflected in their industry 
choice and the characteristics of their investment. A possible explanation for this is that self-
efficacy and risk preference may have a second order effect on industry or venture type choice 
after other influences, such as human capital and specific knowledge, or intrinsic factors. For 
example, a lack of specific knowledge or prohibitively high switching costs related to obtaining 
specific knowledge may result in an inability to earn sufficient returns in other industries. If 
human capital concerns result in limited movement between industries or types of ventures based 
on R&D intensity or extent of technology, this would inhibit industry movement based on other 
concerns, such as risk preference. Consistent with these conjectures, we observe that 89 percent 
of the sample of nascent entrepreneurs reported having at least one year of work experience in 
the industry in which their new venture would compete.  
Surprisingly, we are unaware of empirical research that investigates what factors 
influence entrepreneurs’ industry choice beyond evidence that previous industry experience is 
important. Empirical investigation of what factors drive the industry choices of entrepreneurs 
would enhance understanding of entrepreneurial entry. Additionally, investigating 
entrepreneurial risk dimensions beyond those directly related to industry may provide important 
insight into the determinants of entrepreneurial investment riskiness.  
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We focused on the choices of individuals in the highly uncertain setting of organization 
creation, as uncertainty tends to exacerbate the effects of self-efficacy. In other, less uncertain 
settings, these effects may be weaker. Therefore, the ability to generalize our findings across all 
investment choice settings may be limited. For example, personal beliefs or cognitive biases may 
have a weaker effect on decision makers and their investment choices in existing firms or in later 
stages of entrepreneurship, as they generally face less uncertainty. Additionally, the link between 
self-efficacy and behavior may be weakened by organizational factors, such as formal decision-
making processes designed to dampen the influence of individual preference. Exploring the 
effects of personal beliefs or cognitive biases on decisions made by existing entrepreneurs and 
corporate managers across many investment dimensions would provide bounds on the theories 
and outcomes investigated in this study. 
Although we examined a richer set of entrepreneur investment choices than previously 
researched, there is substantial opportunity to explore further heterogeneity of investment in this 
setting. For example, while we identified the total financial and personal labor invested in the 
venture, we were unable to determine the specific investment amounts devoted to each resource 
and activity in the venturing process. Understanding if there are systematic differences in 
successful and unsuccessful ventures and what traits, characteristics, or beliefs explain variation 
in investment choices is an important, yet relatively unexplored area of research. 
Conclusion 
We find that individuals’ ESE, a domain-specific self-efficacy, is associated with more 
aggressive deployment of resources to their new ventures. In particular, we observe that the 
likelihood of nascent entry, the likelihood of achieving an operating business from their nascent 
activity, the amount of financial capital and the amount of personal effort is greater for 
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individuals with higher ESE. We find that the relationship between ESE and entrepreneurial 
investment is both statistically and economic significant. We contribute to existing research by 
utilizing a longitudinal design based on a representative sample to document a causal 
relationship between ESE and several dimensions of entrepreneurial investment. However, 
unlike research beyond the entrepreneurial domain we find little evidence of an association 
between ESE and risk in entrepreneurial investment in our sample. We suggest further research 
on the relationship between the beliefs of entrepreneurs and their risk choices and actions is 
merited. 
Acknowledgements 
The authors would like to thank seminar participants at Wharton Research Scholars and 2007 
Babson College Entrepreneurship Research Conference in Madrid, Katherine Klein and Cathy 
Schrand for their helpful input. Gavin Cassar would also like to thank the Sol C. Snider 
Entrepreneurial Research Center and Wharton Entrepreneurial Programs for their financial 
support. This research would not be possible without the efforts of the Entrepreneurial Research 
Consortium. 
Self-Efficacy and Entrepreneurial Investment 
39 
References 
 
Agarwal R, Gort M. 2001. First-Mover Advantage and the Speed of Competitive Entry, 1887-
1986. Journal of Law and Economics 44(1): 161-177 
Amit R, Livnat J. 1988. Diversification and the risk-return trade-off. Academy of Management 
Journal 31(1): 154-166 
Bandura A. 1997. Self-Efficacy in Changing Societies. Cambridge University Press 
Bandura A. 2001. Social Cognitive Theory: An Agentic Perspective. Annual Review of 
Psychology 52(1): 1-26 
Bandura A, Cervone D. 1986. Differential engagement of self-reactive mechanisms governing 
the motivational effects of goal systems. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision 
Processes 38(1): 92-113 
Bates T. 1995. Self-employment entry across industry groups. Journal of Business Venturing 
10(2): 143-156 
Baum JR, Locke EA. 2004. The relationship of entrepreneurial traits, skill, and motivation to 
subsequent venture growth. J Appl Psychol 89(4): 587-598 
Baum JR, Locke EA, Smith KG. 2001. A Multidimensional Model of Venture Growth. The 
Academy of Management Journal 44(2): 292-303 
Self-Efficacy and Entrepreneurial Investment 
40 
Betz NE, Hackett G. 1983. The Relationship of Mathematics Self-Efficacy Expectations to the 
Selection of Science-Based College Majors. Journal of Vocational Behavior 23(3): 329-345 
Bitler MP, Moskowitz TJ, Vissing-Jorgensen A. 2005. Testing Agency Theory with 
Entrepreneur Effort and Wealth. The Journal of Finance 60(2): 539-576 
Bruderl J, Preisendorfer P, Ziegler R. 1992. Survival Chances of Newly Founded Business 
Organizations. American Sociological Review 57(2): 227-242 
Busenitz LW, Barney JB. 1997. Differences between entrepreneurs and managers in large 
organizations: Biases and heuristics in strategic decision-making. Journal of Business Venturing 
12(1): 9-30 
Camerer C, Lovallo D. 1999. Overconfidence and Excess Entry: An Experimental Approach. 
The American Economic Review 89(1): 306-318 
Carpenter MA, Pollock TG, Leary MM. 2003. Testing a model of reasoned risk-taking: 
governance, the experience of principals and agents, and global strategy in high-technology IPO 
firms. Strategic Management Journal 24(9): 803-820 
Carter NM, Gartner WB, Shaver KG, Gatewood EJ. 2003. The career reasons of nascent 
entrepreneurs. Journal of Business Venturing 18(1): 13-39 
Self-Efficacy and Entrepreneurial Investment 
41 
Cassar G. 2006. Entrepreneur opportunity costs and intended venture growth. Journal of 
Business Venturing 21(5): 610-632 
Cassar G. 2007. Money, money, money? A longitudinal investigation of entrepreneur career 
reasons, growth preferences and achieved growth. Entrepreneurship & Regional Development 
19(1): 89-107 
Chen CC, Greene PG, Crick A. 1998. Does entrepreneurial self-efficacy distinguish 
entrepreneurs from managers? Journal of Business Venturing 13(4): 295-316 
Clark NM, Dodge JA. 1999. Exploring Self-Efficacy as a Predictor of Disease Management. 
Health Education & Behavior 26(1): 72 
Coles JL, Daniel ND, Naveen L. 2006. Managerial incentives and risk-taking. Journal of 
Financial Economics 79(2): 431-468 
Cooper AC, Woo CY, Dunkelberg WC. 1989. Entrepreneurship and the initial size of firms. 
Journal of Business Venturing 4(5): 317-332 
Davidsson P, Honig B. 2003. The role of social and human capital among nascent entrepreneurs. 
Journal of Business Venturing 18(3): 301-331 
Eden D, Aviram A. 1993. Self-efficacy training to speed reemployment: helping people to help 
themselves. Journal of Applied Psychology 78(3): 352-360 
Self-Efficacy and Entrepreneurial Investment 
42 
Feeser HR, Willard GE. 1990. Founding strategy and performance: A comparison of high and 
low growth high tech firms. Strategic Management Journal 11(2) 
Fombrun CJ, Ginsberg A. 1990. Shifting gears: Enabling change in corporate aggressiveness. 
Strategic Management Journal 11(4) 
Forbes DP. 2005a. Are some entrepreneurs more overconfident than others? Journal of Business 
Venturing 20(5): 623-640 
Forbes DP. 2005b. The effects of strategic decision making on entrepreneurial self-efficacy. 
Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice 29(5): 599-626 
Gartner WB. 2004. Handbook of Entrepreneurial Dynamics: The Process of Business Creation. 
Sage Publications Inc 
Gimeno J, Folta TB, Cooper AC, Woo CY. 1997. Survival of the Fittest? Entrepreneurial Human 
Capital and the Persistence of Underperforming Firms. Administrative Science Quarterly 42(4) 
Gist ME. 1987. Self-Efficacy: Implications for Organizational Behavior and Human Resource 
Management. The Academy of Management Review 12(3): 472-485 
Gist ME, Mitchell TR. 1992. Self-Efficacy: A Theoretical Analysis of Its Determinants and 
Malleability. The Academy of Management Review 17(2): 183-211 
Self-Efficacy and Entrepreneurial Investment 
43 
Grinyer PH, McKiernan P, Yasai-Ardekani M. 1988. Market, organizational and managerial 
correlates of economic performance in the UK electrical engineering industry. Strategic 
Management Journal 9(4) 
Hackett G. 1985. Role of Mathematics Self-Efficacy in the Choice of Math-Related Majors of 
College Women and Men: A Path Analysis. Journal of Counseling Psychology 32(1): 47-56 
Hackett G. 1997. Self-efficacy in career choice and development. In A Bandura (Ed.), Self-
efficacy in changing societies:  232. Cambridge University Press 
Hackett G, Betz NE. 1989. An Exploration of the Mathematics Self-Efficacy/Mathematics 
Performance Correspondence. Journal for Research in Mathematics Education 20(3): 261-273 
Hayward MLA, Shepherd DA, Griffin D. 2006. A Hubris Theory of Entrepreneurship. 
Management Science 52(2): 160-172 
Hmieleski KM, Baron RA. 2008. When does Entrepreneurial Self-Efficacy Enhance Versus 
Reduce Firm Performance? Strategic Entrepreneurship Journal 2: 57-72 
Holtz-Eakin D, Joulfaian D, Rosen HS. 1994. Sticking it Out: Entrepreneurial Survival and 
Liquidity Constraints. The Journal of Political Economy 102(1): 53-75 
Hurst E, Lusardi A. 2004. Liquidity constraints, wealth accumulation and entrepreneurship. 
Journal of Political Economy 112(2): 319-347 
Self-Efficacy and Entrepreneurial Investment 
44 
Jackson DN. 1994. Jackson Personality Inventory: Revised Manual. Sigma Assessment Systems 
Judge TA, Bono JE. 2001. Relationship of core self-evaluations traits—self-esteem, generalized 
self-efficacy, locus of control, and emotional stability—with job satisfaction and job 
performance: A meta-analysis. Journal of Applied Psychology 86(1): 80-92 
Judge TA, Bono JE, Thoresen CJ. 2003. The Core Self-Evaluations Scale: Development of a 
Measure. Personnel Psychology 56(2): 303-332 
Kallman J. 2007. Measuring Risk. Risk Management 54(7): 2 
Kamien M, Schwartz NL. 1971. Expenditure Patterns for Risky R&D Projects. Journal of 
Applied Probability 8(1): 60-73 
Kim PH, Aldrich HE, Keister LA. 2006. Access (Not) Denied: The Impact of Financial, Human, 
and Cultural Capital on Entrepreneurial Entryin the United States. Small Business Economics 
27(1): 5-22 
Kirzner IM. 1978. Competition and Entrepreneurship. University Of Chicago Press 
Knight FH. 1921. Risk, Uncertainty and Profit. Houghton Mifflin Company 
Kothari SP, Laguerre TE, Leone AJ. 2002. Capitalization versus Expensing: Evidence on the 
Uncertainty of Future Earnings from Capital Expenditures versus R&D Outlays. Review of 
Accounting Studies 7(4): 355-382 
Self-Efficacy and Entrepreneurial Investment 
45 
Krueger N, Dickson PR. 1994. How believing in ourselves increases risk taking: Perceived self-
efficacy and opportunity recognition. Decision Sciences 25(3): 385-400 
Lent RW, Hackett G. 1987. Career Self-Efficacy: Empirical Status and Future Directions. 
Journal of Vocational Behavior 30(3): 347-382 
Levenson H. 1973. Multidimensional locus of control in psychiatric patients. J Consult Clin 
Psychol 41(3): 397-404 
Li K, Morck R, Yang F, Yeung B. 2004. Firm-specific variation and openness in emerging 
markets. Review of Economics and Statistics 86(3): 658-669 
Lichtenstein S, Fischhoff B. 1977. Do those who know more also know more about how much 
they know. Organizational Behavior and Human Performance 20(2): 159-183 
Lieberman MB, Montgomery DB. 1988. First-mover advantages. Strategic Management Journal 
9: 41-58 
Locke E, Frederick E, Lee C, Bobko P. 1984. Effects of self-efficacy, goal-setting and 
performance. Journal of Applied Psychology 69: 241-251 
Loury GC. 1979. Market Structure and Innovation. Quarterly Journal of Economics 93(3): 395-
410 
Self-Efficacy and Entrepreneurial Investment 
46 
Lowe RA, Ziedonis AA. 2006. Overoptimism and the Performance of Entrepreneurial Firms. 
Management Science 52(2): 173-186 
Luszczynska A, Gutiérrez-Doña B, Schwarzer R. 2005. General self-efficacy in various domains 
of human functioning: Evidence from five countries. International Journal of Psychology 40(2): 
80-89 
MacCrimmon KR, Wehrung DA. 1990. Characteristics of Risk Taking Executives. Management 
Science 36(4): 422-435 
Mahmood T. 2000. Survival of Newly Founded Businesses: A Log-Logistic Model Approach. 
Small Business Economics 14(3): 223-237 
March JG, Shapira Z. 1987. Managerial Perspectives on Risk and Risk Taking. Management 
Science 33(11): 1404-1418 
McAuley E, Courneya KS, Rudolph DL, Lox CL. 1994. Enhancing exercise adherence in 
middle-aged males and females. Prev Med 23(4): 498-506 
McCarthy AM, Schoorman FD, Cooper AC. 1993. Reinvestment decisions by entrepreneurs: 
rational decision-making or escalation of commitment. Journal of Business Venturing 8(1): 9-24 
McMullen JS, Shepherd DA. 2006. Entrepreneurial Action and the Role of Uncertainty in the 
Theory of the Entrepreneur. Academy of Management Journal 31: 132–152 
Self-Efficacy and Entrepreneurial Investment 
47 
Miller KD, Bromiley P. 1990. Strategic Risk and Corporate Performance: An Analysis of 
Alternative Risk Measures. The Academy of Management Journal 33(4): 756-779 
Moskowitz TJ, Vissing-Jorgensen A. 2002. The Returns to Entrepreneurial Investment: A 
Private Equity Premium Puzzle? The American Economic Review 92(4): 745-778 
Narasimhan C, Zhang ZJ. 2000. Market Entry Strategy under Firm Heterogeneity and 
Asymmetric Payoffs. Marketing Science 19(4): 313-327 
Parker SC, Belghitar Y. 2006. What Happens to Nascent Entrepreneurs? An Econometric 
Analysis of the PSED. Small Business Economics 27(1): 81-101 
Podsakoff PM, MacKenzie SB, Lee JY, Podsakoff NP. 2003. Common method biases in 
behavioral research: A critical review of the literature and recommended remedies. Journal of 
Applied Psychology 88(5): 879-903 
Puri M, Robinson DT. 2007. Optimism and economic choice. Journal of Financial Economics 
86(1): 71-99 
Romanelli E. 1989. Environments and strategies of organization start-up: Effects on early 
survival. Administrative Science Quarterly: 369-387 
Rosenberg M. 1965. Society and the Adolescent Self-Image. Princeton University Press: 
Princeton, New Jersey 
Self-Efficacy and Entrepreneurial Investment 
48 
Rotter JB. 1966. Generalized expectancies for internal versus external control of reinforcement. 
Psychol Monogr 80(1): 1-28 
Scheier MF, Carver CS, Bridges MW. 1994. Distinguishing optimism from neuroticism (and 
trait anxiety, self-mastery, and self-esteem): a reevaluation of the Life Orientation Test. J Pers 
Soc Psychol 67(6): 1063-1078 
Scherer FM. 1967. Research and development resource allocation under rivalry. Quarterly 
Journal of Economics 81(3): 359–394 
Schumpeter JA. 1934. The Theory of Economic Development, translated by Redvers Opie. 
Harvard: Economic Studies 46 
Schweiger DM, Sandberg WR, Ragan JW. 1986. Group Approaches for Improving Strategic 
Decision Making: A Comparative Analysis of Dialectical Inquiry, Devil's Advocacy, and 
Consensus. The Academy of Management Journal 29(1): 51-71 
Shepherd DA, McMullen JS, Jennings PD. 2007. The formation of opportunity beliefs: 
overcoming ignorance and reducing doubt. Strategic Entrepreneurship Journal 1: 75-95 
Sherer M, Maddux JE, Mercandante B, Prentice-Dunn S, Jacobs B, Rogers RW. 1982. The self-
efficacy scale: Construction and validation. Psychological reports 51(2): 663-671 
Self-Efficacy and Entrepreneurial Investment 
49 
Simon M, Houghton SM. 2003. The relationship between overconfidence and the introduction of 
risky products: evidence from a field study. Academy of Management Journal 46(2): 139-149 
Simon M, Houghton SM, Savelli S. 2003. Out of the frying pan…? Why small business 
managers introduce high-risk products. Journal of Business Venturing 18(3): 419-440 
Singh JV. 1986. Performance, slack, and risk taking in organizational decision making. Academy 
of Management Journal 29(3): 562-585 
Stajkovic AD, Luthans F. 1998. Self-efficacy and work-related performance: A meta-analysis. 
Psychological Bulletin 124(2): 240-261 
Weinzimmer LG, Bond III EU, Houston MB, Nystrom PC. 2003. Relating marketing expertise 
on the top management team and strategic market aggressiveness to financial performance and 
shareholder value. Journal of Strategic Marketing 11(2): 27 
White RE, Thornhill S, Hampson E. 2006. Entrepreneurs and evolutionary biology: The 
relationship between testosterone and new venture creation. Organizational Behavior and 
Human Decision Processes 100(1): 21-34 
Whyte G, Saks AM, Hook S. 1997. When success breeds failure: The role of self-efficacy in 
escalating commitment to a losing course of action. Journal of Organizational Behavior 18(5) 
Self-Efficacy and Entrepreneurial Investment 
50 
Wood R, Bandura A. 1989a. Impact of conceptions ofability on self-regulatory mechanisms and 
complex decision making. Journal of personality and social psychology 56(3.407-415) 
Wood R, Bandura A. 1989b. Social Cognitive Theory of Organizational Management. The 
Academy of Management Review 14(3): 361-384 
Wood R, Bandura A, Bailey T. 1990. Mechanisms governing organizational performance in 
complex decision-making environments. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision 
Processes 46(2): 181-201 
Wulfert E, Wan CK. 1993. Condom use: a self-efficacy model. Health Psychol 12(5): 346-353 
Zhao H, Seibert SE, Hills GE. 2005. The mediating role of self-efficacy in the development of 
entrepreneurial intentions. Journal of Applied Psychology 90(6): 1265-1272 
 
 51 
TABLE 1 
Descriptive Statistics and Correlations
a 
 Variables Mean 
Std. 
Dev. 
n  1 2 3 4 5 7 8 9 10 11 12 
                 
1.  ESE 4.13 0.72 888             
2.  Risk Pref. 0.31 0.21 877  0.20           
3.  Nascent Entp. 0.66 0.47 1263  0.29 0.07          
4.  Operating Entp. 0.44 0.50 606  0.16 -0.01 -         
5.  Wealth Share 0.19 0.49 661  0.13 0.09 - 0.08        
6.  Hours/Week 20.34 21.13 399  0.26 0.23 - 0.25 0.12       
7.  Risk (Bitler) 0.84 0.20 776  0.02 0.03 -0.04 0.11 0.03 -0.01      
8.  Risk (Li et al) 0.30 0.13 683  0.03 0.04 0.25 -0.04 -0.05 -0.16 0.14     
9.  SIC Death Rate 0.11 0.09 450  0.09 0.06 0.23 0.39 -0.11 0.06 - 0.29    
10.  R&D 0.31 0.46 792  0.06 0.07 - -0.06 0.06 0.05 -0.02 0.07 -0.20   
11.  High Tech 0.36 0.48 796  -0.04 0.11 - 0.06 0.06 -0.01 0.15 0.32 -0.11 0.20  
12.  College 0.26 0.44 1248  0.00 0.07 0.09 0.06 -0.04 -0.01 0.00 0.06 0.09 -0.04 0.01 
13.  Mgr. Exp 1.72 1.05 1215  0.13 0.08 0.13 0.08 0.01 0.10 0.00 0.00 0.11 0.00 -0.04 
14.  HH Income 10.61 1.04 1122  0.04 0.05 0.10 0.14 -0.12 0.09 0.03 0.06 0.02 -0.06 -0.04 
15.  HH Wealth 11.14 1.66 1058  0.00 0.03 0.07 0.14 -0.35 0.13 -0.02 0.04 0.06 -0.02 -0.02 
16.  Parents Entp. 0.48 0.50 1233  0.06 -0.02 0.09 -0.01 -0.01 0.03 -0.04 -0.03 0.04 -0.02 -0.02 
17.  Age 40.01 12.19 1223  -0.04 -0.03 -0.03 0.07 -0.04 0.01 -0.10 -0.08 0.02 -0.05 -0.05 
18.  Female 0.51 0.50 1260  -0.07 -0.22 -0.07 0.00 -0.08 -0.10 -0.07 -0.06 -0.10 -0.05 -0.19 
19.  Married 0.52 0.50 1245  0.06 -0.06 0.07 0.10 -0.08 0.03 0.02 0.04 0.10 -0.18 -0.14 
20.  In Development 0.21 0.41 813  0.08 0.04 - -0.11 0.00 -0.11 0.03 0.06 -0.15 0.15 0.04 
21.  In Testing 0.19 0.39 813  0.08 0.02 - -0.04 0.09 0.08 -0.05 -0.02 -0.10 0.02 0.02 
22.  Completed 0.43 0.50 813  -0.07 -0.02 - 0.22 -0.02 0.12 -0.01 -0.01 0.10 -0.15 -0.07 
23.  South 0.37 0.48 1263  0.04 0.04 -0.02 0.01 0.08 0.04 0.01 -0.04 -0.01 0.05 0.03 
24.  Midwest 0.21 0.41 1263  -0.03 -0.05 0.00 0.02 0.00 -0.08 0.02 -0.07 0.06 -0.03 -0.07 
25. West 0.22 0.42 1263   0.02 0.01 0.03 -0.05 -0.04 0.05 0.00 0.08 -0.06 0.03 0.05 
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TABLE 1 (cont.) 
Descriptive Statistics and Correlations
 
 Variables 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 
               
14.  Mgr. Exp 0.12             
15.  HH Income 0.09 0.14            
16.  HH Wealth 0.12 0.27 0.42           
17.  Parents Entp. 0.10 0.09 0.06 0.08          
18.  Age 0.03 0.45 -0.01 0.23 0.01         
19.  Female -0.01 -0.10 -0.08 -0.06 0.04 0.05        
20.  Married 0.03 0.19 0.26 0.24 0.04 0.15 -0.03       
21.  In Development -0.05 0.01 0.02 -0.05 0.00 -0.08 -0.04 -0.08      
22.  In Testing 0.00 0.09 -0.03 -0.02 0.07 0.04 -0.07 -0.01 -0.25     
23.  Completed 0.10 0.02 0.08 0.10 0.04 0.09 0.05 0.16 -0.45 -0.42    
24.  South 0.02 0.00 -0.03 -0.04 -0.06 -0.05 -0.04 0.04 0.01 0.04 -0.05   
25.  Midwest -0.02 -0.03 -0.02 0.01 0.02 0.05 0.03 -0.01 -0.04 0.01 0.02 -0.40  
26.  West -0.04 0.01 0.04 0.04 0.06 0.02 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.04 -0.01 -0.41 -0.28 
  
a
 Correlation coefficients in bold are significant at the 5% level (two-tailed tests). 
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TABLE 2 
Results of Logistic Regression of Entrepreneurial Entry 
a 
 Nascent Entrepreneur  Operating Entrepreneur 
Variables Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4 
                
ESE 0.87 *** (0.11)  0.86 *** (0.13)  0.66 *** (0.17)  0.80 *** (0.21) 
              
Risk Preference 0.25  (0.37)  0.60  (0.45)  -0.19 (0.46)  -0.33 (0.58) 
College     0.36 † (0.20)      -0.20 (0.26) 
Mgr. Exp.     0.25 ** (0.10)      0.05 (0.13) 
HH Income     -0.04  (0.11)      0.34 † (0.19) 
HH Wealth     0.02  (0.07)      0.23 * (0.09) 
Parents Entp.     -0.09  (0.18)      -0.10 (0.24) 
Age     -0.02 * (0.01)      0.00 (0.01) 
Female     0.02  (0.18)      0.06 (0.25) 
Married     0.24  (0.19)      -0.11 (0.26) 
In Development             -0.22 (0.45) 
In Testing             0.12 (0.42) 
Completed             0.90 * (0.37) 
South     -0.11  (0.24)      -0.04 (0.34) 
Midwest     0.21  (0.27)      0.24 (0.36) 
West     0.23  (0.28)      0.01 (0.38) 
Intercept -2.24 *** (0.35)  -1.99  (1.27)  -2.25 (0.60)  -9.29 *** (2.09) 
                
-2Log Likelihood 1064.46    779.74    589.72   426.57  
Model Chi-Square 73.63 ***   80.91 ***   16.16 ***   53.82 ***  
Pseudo-R
2
 0.08    0.12    0.04   0.14  
n 863    660    438   347  
                               
a
 Standard errors are reported in parentheses. † p < 0.10; * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001, two tailed tests. 
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TABLE 3 
Results of OLS Regressions on Financial and Human Resource Investment 
a 
 Wealth Share  Hours per Week 
Variables First Wave  Later  First Wave  Later 
                
ESE 0.10 * (0.04)  0.17 † (0.10)  8.18 *** (2.04)  8.41 * (3.55) 
              
Risk Preference 0.16  (0.13)  0.42  (0.27)  21.55 *** (6.17)  7.52 (9.54) 
College -0.05  (0.06)  -0.003  (0.13)  0.78 (2.81)  1.63 (4.53) 
Mgr. Exp. 0.004  (0.03)  -0.03  (0.06)  1.10 (1.44)  -0.41 (2.14) 
HH Income         1.17 (1.39)  -3.13 (3.23) 
HH Wealth         0.98 (1.0)  1.17 (1.46) 
Parents Entp. 0.002  (0.05)  -0.04  (0.11)  -1.29 (2.76)  -4.58 (4.01) 
Age -0.002  (0.003)  -0.01  (0.01)  -0.02 (0.14)  0.12 (0.22) 
Female -0.06  (0.05)  -0.22 * (0.11)  -2.10 (2.71)  -8.60 * (4.04) 
Married -0.12 * (0.05)  -0.21 † (0.11)  -0.22 (2.83)  3.67 (4.19) 
In Development 0.07  (0.09)  0.17  (0.22)  0.88 (4.73)  6.34 (7.85) 
In Testing 0.14  (0.09)  0.10  (0.21)  7.92 † (4.62)  10.53 (7.19) 
Completed 0.11  (0.08)  0.28  (0.19)  12.14 ** (4.0)  9.46 (6.52) 
South 0.14 † (0.08)  -0.16  (0.15)  5.64 (3.45)  -3.41 (5.45) 
Midwest 0.11  (0.08)  -0.20  (0.17)  -0.86 (3.98)  -1.45 (5.86) 
West 0.02  (0.08)  -0.08  (0.17)  -0.95 (3.85)  -9.28 (5.97) 
Intercept -0.16  (0.18)  0.21  (0.42)  -46.69 * (18.73)  10.96 (34.77) 
                
F-Stat 1.87 *   1.61 †   3.99 ***   1.37  
Adjusted-R
2
 0.03    0.06    0.18   0.04  
n 415    135    219   142  
                               
a
 Standard errors are reported in parentheses. † p < 0.10; * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001, two tailed tests. 
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TABLE 4 
Results of Regressions of Investment Risk 
a 
 Bitler et al. (2005)   Li et al. (2004)   Industry Death Rate   R&D a Major Priority   Venture High-Tech 
Variables Model 1   Model 2   Model 3   Model 4   Model 5 
                    
ESE 0.000  (0.013)  0.012  (0.010)  0.013 † (0.008)  0.183  (0.190)  -0.068  (0.175) 
                    
Risk Preference -0.019  (0.041)  -0.008  (0.034)  0.007  (0.032)  0.701  (0.536)  0.502  (0.528) 
College 0.013  (0.018)  0.020  (0.016)  0.009  (0.014)  -0.038 † (0.253)  0.109  (0.245) 
Mgr. Exp. 0.012  (0.009)  0.006  (0.008)  0.007  (0.006)  0.083  (0.134)  -0.026  (0.127) 
HH Income -0.003  (0.011)  0.003  (0.007)  -0.004  (0.010)  -0.190  (0.136)  -0.205  (0.139) 
HH Wealth 0.003  (0.007)  0.002  (0.005)  -0.001  (0.004)  -0.048  (0.086)  0.050  (0.085) 
Parents Entp. -0.002  (0.017)  -0.0004  (0.014)  0.001  (0.012)  0.121  (0.229)  0.320  (0.226) 
Age -0.002 ** (0.001)  -0.002 ** (0.001)  0.0002  (0.001)  -0.014  (0.012)  -0.017  (0.012) 
Female -0.010  (0.017)  -0.027 † (0.014)  -0.021 * (0.013)  -0.400 † (0.232)  -0.882 *** (0.230) 
South 0.0001  (0.023)  -0.015  (0.019)  -0.001  (0.017)  0.495  (0.331)  0.271  (0.310) 
Midwest 0.026  (0.025)  -0.022  (0.021)  0.029  (0.018)  0.332  (0.354)  -0.483  (0.349) 
West 0.037  (0.025)  0.014  (0.022)  -0.015  (0.019)  0.499  (0.365)  0.283  (0.342) 
Intercept 0.914 *** (0.116)  0.280 ** (0.087)  0.112  (0.101)  1.031  (1.627)  1.892  (1.619) 
                    
-2LogLikelihood             477.10    488.56   
Model Chi-
Square             15.47    31.04 **  
F-Stat 0.99    1.67    1.31           
Adj. R
2
 0.000    0.022    0.015           
Pseudo-R
2
             0.037    0.073   
n 390    352    245    408    410   
                                        
 
a
 Operational risk is modeled using OLS regression, manager risk is modeled using logistic regression. Standard errors are reported in parentheses; 
 † p < .10;  * p < .05;   ** p < .01;  *** p < .001, two tailed tests. 
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TABLE 5 
Results of Path Analysis 
a 
 
Operating 
Entrepreneur 
 Wealth Share 
Path Model 1  Model 2 
        
1. ESE – Dep. Var. 0.131 *** (0.03)  0.082 * (0.03) 
      
2. ESE – Risk Perc. 5.715 *** (1.43)  5.800 *** (1.43) 
      
3. ESE – Scale 0.379 ** (0.13)  0.411 ** (0.13) 
      
4. Risk Perc. – Dep. Var. 0.002 * (0.001)  0.000 (0.001) 
      
5. Scale – Dep. Var. -0.041 † (0.02)  0.017 (0.02) 
      
RMSEA 0.029   0.028  
CFI 0.97   0.97  
Chi-Square 6.258 †   5.887  
p-value 0.10   0.12  
      
a
 Standard errors are reported in parentheses. † p < 0.10; * p < 0.05; ** p 
< 0.01; *** p < 0.001, two tailed tests. Path model is presented in Figure 
1. Model DF = 3 for models 1, 2 and 3 
 . 
 
  
 
FIGURE 1 
Path Diagram
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Appendix A: Validity Study 
To investigate the construct validity of the measures used in this study, a validity study 
was undertaken. Surveys were administered to 148 undergraduate students enrolled in an 
introductory accounting course at a large, urban university in the northeast United States. After 
excluding surveys with missing or incomplete responses a final sample of 125, a response rate of 
84.5 percent. The survey included measures of entrepreneurial self-efficacy (ESE) and risk 
preference (Risk Preference) used in the current field study. Additionally, the survey included 
established scales from the literature relating to the same or related constructs underlying the 
study.  
These included the entrepreneurial self-efficacy (CGC ESE) scale from Chen et al. 
(1998), the generalized self-efficacy (GSE) scale from Sherer et al. (1982), the single-item self-
esteem scale from Robins et al. (2001), the core self-evaluation scale from Judge et al. (2003), 
the chance and internal locus of control (LOC) scales from Levenson (1973), the overconfidence 
scale from Busenitz and Barney (1997) and Fischhoff and Lichtenstein (1977), the dispositional 
optimism scale from the Revised Life Orientation Test (Scheier, Carver, & Bridges, 1994), and 
the risk taking (JPI-R Risk) scale from the Jackson Personality Index-Revised (Jackson, 1994). 
The descriptive statistics and correlations of the validity study are reported in Table A1. The 
mean and standard deviation of ESE and Risk Preference differ from those reported in Table 1 
because Table A1 is based on the validity study sample, while Table 1 is based on the PSED 
sample. 
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TABLE A1 
Descriptive Statistics and Correlations for Validity Study Sample
a 
Variables Mean 
Std. 
Dev. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
                
1. ESE 4.00 0.66 (0.78)            
2. Risk Preference 0.40 0.24 0.23 (0.48)           
3. CGC ESE 3.70 0.54 0.53 0.27 (0.92)          
4. JPI-R Risk -0.01 0.22 0.23 0.60 0.26 (0.81)         
5. Overconfidence 5.12 22.16 0.06 0.21 0.18 0.20 -        
6. GSE 0.42 0.51 0.21 0.14 0.37 0.14 0.07 (0.79)       
7. LOC 0.71 0.41 0.19 0.10 0.31 -0.03 0.03 0.62 (0.65)      
8. Dispositional Optimism 0.74 0.76 0.17 0.01 0.21 0.12 0.09 0.41 0.32 (0.76)     
9. Self Esteem 4.04 0.84 0.29 0.14 0.28 0.23 0.10 0.52 0.32 0.38 -    
10. Core Self Evaluation 0.73 0.57 0.30 0.14 0.36 0.15 0.06 0.67 0.48 0.37 0.61 (0.86)   
11. Female 0.44 0.50 -0.18 -0.12 -0.12 -0.35 -0.21 0.01 0.12 -0.16 -0.12 -0.17 -  
12. Entrepreneurial Intent 2.78 1.06 0.56 0.28 0.32 0.26 0.05 -0.08 -0.01 0.05 0.17 0.08 -0.26 (0.83) 
a
 n = 125.  (Internal consistency on the diagonals). Values displayed are Pearson correlation coefficients. Coefficients with absolute values greater than 0.17, 
0.22, and 0.29 are significant at 0.05, 0.01, and 0.001 level (two-tailed), respectively. 
 
